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NP Reasoning in the Monotone µ-Calculus
Daniel Hausmann and Lutz Schro¨der
Friedrich-Alexander-Universita¨t Erlangen-Nu¨rnberg, Germany
Abstract. Satisfiability checking for monotone modal logic is known
to be (only) NP-complete. We show that this remains true when the
logic is extended with aconjunctive and alternation-free fixpoint opera-
tors as well as the universal modality; the resulting logic – the aconjunc-
tive alternation-free monotone µ-calculus with the universal modality –
contains both concurrent propositional dynamic logic (CPDL) and the
alternation-free fragment of game logic as fragments. We obtain our re-
sult from a characterization of satisfiability by means of Bu¨chi games
with polynomially many Eloise nodes.
1 Introduction
Monotone modal logic differs from normal modal logics (such asK [3], equivalent
to the standard description logic ALC [1]) by giving up normality, i.e. distribu-
tion of conjunction over the box modality, but retaining monotonicity of the
modalities. Its semantics is based on (monotone) neighbourhood models instead
of Kripke models. Monotone modalities have been variously used as epistemic
operators that restrict the combination of knowledge by epistemic agents [23]; as
next-step modalities in the evolution of concurrent systems, e.g. in concurrent
propositional dynamic logic (CPDL) [20]; and as game modalities in systems
where one transition step is determined by moves of two players, e.g. in Parikh’s
game logic [16,19,11,6]. The monotonicity condition suffices to enable formation
of fixpoints; one thus obtains the monotone µ-calculus [7], which contains both
CPDL and game logic as fragments (indeed, the recent proof of completeness of
game logic [6] is based on embedding game logic into the monotone µ-calculus).
While many modal logics (including K/ALC) have PSpace-complete sat-
isfiability problems in the absence of fixpoints, it is known that satisfiability
in monotone modal logic is only NP-complete [23] (the lowest possible com-
plexity given that the logic has the full set of Boolean connectives). In the
present paper, we show that the low complexity is preserved under two ex-
tensions that usually cause the complexity to rise from PSpace-complete to
ExpTime-complete: Adding the universal modality (equivalently global axioms
or, in description logic parlance, a general TBox) and aconjunctive alternation-
free fixpoints ; that is, we show that satisfiability checking in the aconjunctive
alternation-free fragment of the monotone µ-calculus with the universal modal-
ity [7] is onlyNP-complete. This logic subsumes both CPDL and the alternation-
free fragment of game logic [19]. Thus, our results imply that satisfiability check-
ing in these logics is only NP-complete (the best previously known upper bound
being ExpTime in both cases [16,20,19]); for comparison, standard propositional
dynamic logic (PDL) and in fact already the extension of K with the universal
modality are ExpTime-hard. (Our results thus seemingly contradict previous
results on ExpTime-completeness of CPDL. However, these results rely on em-
bedding standard PDL into CPDL, which requires changing the semantics of
CPDL to interpret atomic programs as sequential programs, i.e. as relations
rather than neighbourhood systems [20].) Our results are based on a variation of
the game-theoretic approach to µ-calculi [15]. Specifically, we reduce satisfiabil-
ity checking to the computation of winning regions in a satisfiability game that
has exponentially many Abelard-nodes but only polynomially many Eloise-nodes,
so that history-free winning strategies for Eloise have polynomial size. From this
approach we also derive a polynomial model property.
Organization We recall basics on fixpoints, automata and games in Section 2,
and the syntax and semantics of the monotone µ-calculus in Section 3. We dis-
cuss key technical tools, timeouts and tracking automata, in Sections 4 and 5,
respectively. In Section 6, we establish our main results using a game character-
ization of satisfiability.
2 Notation and Preliminaries
We fix basic concepts and notation on fixpoints, automata, and games.
Fixpoints Let U be a set; we write P(U) for the powerset of U . Let f : P(U)→
P(U) be a monotone function, i.e. f(A) ⊆ f(B) whenever A ⊆ B ⊆ U . By the
Knaster-Tarski fixpoint theorem, the greatest (GFP) and least (LFP) fixpoints
of f are given by
LFP f =
⋂
{V ⊆ U | f(V ) ⊆ V } GFP f =
⋃
{V ⊆ U | V ⊆ f(V )},
and are thus also the least prefixpoint (f(V ) ⊆ V ) and greatest postfixpoint
(V ⊆ f(V )) of f , respectively. For V ⊆ U and n ∈ N, we put
f0(V ) = V fn+1(V ) = f(fn(V )).
If U is finite, then LFP f = f |U|(∅) and GFP f = f |U|(U) by Kleene’s fixpoint
theorem.
Infinite Words and Automata For any set U , we denote the sets of finite
and infinite sequences of elements of U by U∗ and Uω, respectively. We often view
sequences τ = u1, u2, . . . in U
∗ (or Uω) as partial (total) functions τ : N ⇀ U ,
writing τ(i) = ui. We write
Inf(τ) = {u ∈ U | ∀i ∈ N. ∃j > i. τ(j) = u}
for the set of elements of U that occur infinitely often in τ .
A Bu¨chi automaton A = (Q,Σ, δ, q0, F ) consists of a finite set Q of states, a
finite alphabet Σ, a transition function δ : Q × Σ → P(Q), an initial state q0,
and a set F ⊆ Q of accepting states. If |δ(q, a)| = 1 for all q, a, then A is
deterministic (and nondeterministic otherwise). A run of A on an infinite word
w = a0, a1, . . . ∈ Σω is an infinite sequence ρ = q0, q1, . . . ∈ Qω such that
qi+1 ∈ δ(qi, ai) for all i ≥ 0. A run ρ is accepting if Inf(ρ) ∩ F 6= ∅, and A
accepts the language L(A) ⊆ Σω consisting of all infinite words on which A has
an accepting run.
Infinite Games A Bu¨chi game G = (V,E, v0, F ) consists of a set V of nodes,
partitioned into the sets V∃ of Eloise-nodes and V∀ of Abelard-nodes, a set E ⊆
V ×V of moves, an initial node v0, and a set F ⊆ V of accepting nodes. We write
E(v) = {v′ | (v, v′) ∈ E}. For simplicity, assume that v0 ∈ V∃ and that the game
is alternating, i.e. E(v) ⊆ V∀ for all v ∈ V∃, and E(v) ⊆ V∃ for all v ∈ V∀ (our
games will have this shape). A play of G is a sequence τ = v0, v1, . . . of nodes
such that (vi, vi+1) ∈ E for all i ≥ 0 and τ is either infinite or ends in a node
without outgoing moves. Eloise wins a play τ if and only if τ is finite and ends in
an Abelard-node or τ is infinite and Inf(τ)∩F 6= ∅, that is, τ infinitely often visits
an accepting node. A history-free Eloise-strategy is a partial function s : V∃ ⇀ V
such that s(v0) is defined, and whenever s(v) is defined, then (v, s(v)) ∈ E and
s(v′) is defined for all v′ ∈ E(s(v)). A play v0, v1, . . . is an s-play if vi+1 = s(vi)
whenever vi ∈ V∃. We say that s is a winning strategy if Eloise wins every s-play,
and that Eloise wins G if there is a winning strategy for Eloise. Bu¨chi games
are history-free determined, i.e. in every Bu¨chi game, one of the players has a
history-free winning strategy [14].
3 The Monotone µ-Calculus
We proceed to recall the syntax and semantics of the monotone µ-calculus.
Syntax We fix countably infinite sets P, A and V of atoms, atomic programs
and (fixpoint) variables, respectively; we assume that P is closed under duals
(i.e. atomic negation), i.e. p ∈ P implies p ∈ P, where p = p. Formulae of the
monotone µ-calculus (in negation normal form) are then defined by the grammar
ψ, φ := ⊥ | ⊤ | p | ψ ∧ φ | ψ ∨ φ | 〈a〉ψ | [a]ψ | X | ηX.ψ
where p ∈ P, a ∈ A, X ∈ V and η ∈ {µ, ν}. As usual, µ and ν are understood as
taking least and greatest fixpoints, respectively, and bind their variables, giving
rise to the standard notion of free variable in a formula ψ. We write FV(ψ) for
the set of free variables in ψ, and say that ψ is closed if FV(ψ) = ∅. Negation ¬ is
not included but can be defined by taking negation normal forms as usual, with
¬p = p. We refer to formulae of the shape [a]φ or 〈a〉φ as (a-)modal literals. As
indicated in the introduction, the modalities [a], 〈a〉 have been equipped with
various readings, recalled in more detail in Example 10.
We let sub(ψ) denote the set of subformulae of ψ (including ψ itself) and
define the size |ψ| of ψ as |ψ| = |sub(ψ)|. A formula ψ is guarded if whenever
ηX. φ ∈ sub(ψ), then all free occurrences of X in φ are under the scope of at least
one modal operator. We generally restrict to guarded formulae (this is standard
although possibly not without loss of generality [9]). A closed formula ψ is clean
if all fixpoint variables in ψ are bound by exactly one fixpoint operator. Then
θ(X) denotes the subformula ηX.φ that binds X in ψ, and X is a least (greatest)
fixpoint variable if η = µ (η = ν). A clean formula is alternation-free if none of its
subformulae contains both a free least and a free greatest fixpoint variable. An
alternation-free formula ψ is aconjunctive if in every subformula χ1 ∧ χ2 of ψ,
at most one of the conjuncts χ1 or χ2 contains a free least fixpoint variable.
Finally, ψ is irredundant if X ∈ FV(φ) whenever ηX.φ ∈ sub(ψ).
Remark 1. We have defined formula size to account for sharing of subformulae
with multiple occurrences; that is, we think of formulae as being compactly
represented as dags rather than trees. Our upper complexity bounds thus become
stronger, i.e. they hold even for this small measure of input size.
Semantics The monotone µ-calculus is interpreted over neighbourhood models
(or epistemic structures [23]) F = (W,N, I) where N : A×W → 2(2
W ) assigns to
each atomic program a and each state w a set N(a, w) ⊆ 2W of a-neighbourhoods
of w, and I : P → 2W interprets propositional atoms (by 2, we denote the set
{⊥,⊤} of Boolean truth values, and 2W is the set of maps W → 2, which is in
bijection with the powerset P(W )). Given such an F , each formula ψ is assigned
an extension JψKσ ⊆ W that additionally depends on a valuation σ : V → 2W ,
and is inductively defined by
JpKσ = I(p) JXKσ = σ(X)
Jψ ∧ φKσ = JψKσ ∩ JφKσ Jψ ∨ φKσ = JψKσ ∪ JφKσ
J〈a〉ψKσ = {w ∈ W | ∃S ∈ N(a, w). S ⊆ JψKσ} JµX.ψKσ = LFPJψK
X
σ
J[a]ψKσ = {w ∈ W | ∀S ∈ N(a, w). S ∩ JψKσ 6= ∅} JνX.ψKσ = GFPJψK
X
σ
where, for U ⊆ W and fixpoint variables X,Y ∈ V, we put JψKXσ (U) =
JψKσ[X 7→U ], (σ[X 7→ U ])(X) = U and (σ[X 7→ U ])(Y ) = σ(Y ) if X 6= Y . We
omit the dependence on F in the notation [[φ]]σ, and when necessary clarify the
underlying neighbourhood model by phrases such as ‘in F ’. If ψ is closed, then
its extension does not depend on the valuation, so we just write JψK. A closed
formula ψ is satisfiable if there is a neighbourhood model F such that JψK 6= ∅
in F ; in this case, we also say that ψ is satisfiable over F . For clean formulae ψ
with FV(ψ) 6= ∅, we use JψK to denote the extension of the closed formula that
is obtained from ψ by repeatedly replacing free fixpoint variables X with θ(X).
Given a set Ψ of formulae, we write JΨK =
⋂
ψ∈Ψ JψK. An (infinite) path through
a neighbourhood model (W,N, I) is a sequence x0, x1, . . . of states xi ∈W such
that for all i ≥ 0, there are a ∈ A and S ∈ N(a, xi) such that xi+1 ∈ S.
The soundness direction of our game characterization will rely on the follow-
ing immediate property of the semantics, which may be seen as soundness of a
modal tableau rule [4].
Lemma 2. [23, Proposition 3.8] If [a]φ ∧ 〈a〉ψ is satisfiable over a neighbour-
hood model F , then φ ∧ ψ is also satisfiable over F .
Remark 3. The roles of the dual box and diamond operators [a] and 〈a〉 are
completely symmetric, and indeed the notation is not uniform in the litera-
ture. Our use of [a] and 〈a〉 is generally in agreement with work on game
logic [16] and CPDL [20]; work on monotone modal logics and the monotone
µ-calculus [23,7,22] interchange the role of box and diamond.
Remark 4. The semantics may equivalently be presented in terms of monotone
neighbourhood models, where the set of a-neighbourhoods of a state is required
to be upwards closed under subset inclusion [16,19,11,7]. In this semantics, the
interpretation of 〈a〉φ simplifies to just requiring that the extension of φ is an
a-neighbourhood of the current state. We opt for the variant where upwards
closure is instead incorporated into the interpretation of the modalities, so as
to avoid having to distinguish between monotone neighbourhood models and
their representation as upwards closures of (plain) neighbourhood models, e.g.
in small model theorems.
Next we recall the relevant notion of bisimulation for neighbourhood models.
Definition 5 (Monotone bisimulation [17,18]). Let (W,N, I) be a neigh-
bourhood model. A relation S ⊆W ×W is a monotone bisimulation if and only
if we have, for all (x, y) ∈ S, that
– for all a ∈ A and all A ∈ N(a, x), there is B ∈ N(a, y) such that for all
v ∈ B, there is u ∈ A such that (u, v) ∈ S,
– for all a ∈ A and all B ∈ N(a, y), there is A ∈ N(a, x) such that for all
u ∈ A, there is v ∈ B such that (u, v) ∈ S,
– for all p ∈ P, x ∈ I(p) if and only if y ∈ I(p).
A corresponding version [17,10] of the van Benthem Theorem for monotone
modal logic implies that if two states x, y ∈ W are related by some monotone
bisimulation, then they satisfy the same modal formulae, that is, they are logi-
cally indistinguishable.
Definition 6. We define the semantics of the master modality  by putting
JφKσ = {w ∈W | ∀a ∈ A. ∀S ∈ N(a, w). ∀v ∈ S. v ∈ JφKσ}.
Lemma 7. The master modality is not definable in the monotone µ-calculus.
Proof. Let F = (W,N, I) be a neighbourhood model such that W =
{x, y, u, v, w}, N(a, x) = {{u}, {u, v}}, N(a, y) = {{w}}, N(b, y) = ∅ for all
b 6= a, and I(p) = {u,w}. Then we have y ∈ JpK but x /∈ JpK since w ∈ JpK
but v /∈ JpK. We define S = {(x, y), (u,w)}, which is a monotone bisimula-
tion: for {u} ∈ N(a, x), we pick {w} ∈ N(a, y), having (u,w) ∈ S, and for
{u, v} ∈ N(a, x) we again pick {w} ∈ N(a, y), again having (u,w) ∈ S, as re-
quired; for the other direction, we pick {u} ∈ N(a, x) for {w} ∈ N(a, y), having
(u,w) ∈ S again. Also, x and y agree on propositional atoms, as do u and v.
By the monotone modal logic version of the van Benthem theorem, x and y
cannot be distinguished by a monotone modal formula and, since for fixed F ,
fixpoint formulas are equivalent to modal formulas (namely, to their Kleene ap-
proximations), x and y can also not be distinguished by a monotone µ-calculus
formula. ⊓⊔
Hence global assumptions or equivalently the universal modality, are an extension
to the monotone µ-calculus. Formal definitions are as follows.
Definition 8 (Global assumptions). Given a closed formula φ, a φ-model is
a neighbourhood model F = (W,N, I) in which [[φ]] = W . A formula ψ is φ-
satisfiable if ψ is satisfiable over some φ-model; in this context, we refer to φ as
the global assumption, and to the problem of deciding whether ψ is φ-satisfiable
as satisfiability checking under global assumptions.
We also define an extension of the monotone µ-calculus, the monotone µ-calculus
with the universal modality, by adding two alternatives
· · · | [∀]φ | [∃]φ
to the grammar, in both alternatives restricting φ to be closed. The definition of
the semantics over a neighbourhood model (W,N, I) is correspondingly extended
by [[[∀]φ]] = W if [[φ]] = W , and [[[∀]φ]] = ∅ otherwise; dually, [[[∃]φ]] = W if
[[φ]] 6= ∅, and [[[∃]φ]] = ∅ otherwise. That is, [∀]φ says that φ holds in all states of
the model, and [∃]φ that φ holds in some state.
Remark 9. In description logic, global assumptions are typically called (gen-
eral) TBoxes or terminologies [1]. For many next-step modal logics (i.e. modal
logics without fixpoint operators), satisfiability checking becomes harder under
global assumptions. A typical case is the standard modal logic K (corresponding
to the description logic ALC), in which (plain) satisfiability checking is PSpace-
complete [12] while satisfiability checking under global assumptions is ExpTime-
complete [8,5]. Our results show that such an increase in complexity does not
happen for monotone modalities.
For purposes of satisfiability checking in complexity NP and above, the uni-
versal modality and global assumptions are mutually reducible in a standard
manner, where the non-trivial direction (from the universal modality to global
assumptions) is by guessing beforehand which subformulae [∀]φ, [∃]φ hold.
Example 10. 1. In epistemic logic, neighbourhood models have been
termed epistemic structures [23]. In this context, the a ∈ A are thought of as
agents, the a-neighbourhoods of a state w are the facts known to agent a in w,
and correspondingly the reading of [a]φ is ‘a knows φ’. The use of (monotone)
neighbourhood models and the ensuing failure of normality imply that agents
can still weaken facts that they know but are not in general able to combine
them, i.e. knowing φ and knowing ψ does not entail knowing φ ∧ ψ [23].
2. In concurrent propositional dynamic logic (CPDL), a-neighbourhoods of
a state are understood as sets of states that can be reached concurrently, while
the choice between several a-neighbourhoods of a state models sequential non-
determinism. CPDL indexes modalities over composite programs α, formed using
tests ?φ and the standard operations of propositional dynamic logic (PDL) (i.e.
union ∪, sequential composition ‘;’, and Kleene star (−)∗) and additionally inter-
section ∩. It forms a sublogic of Parikh’s game logic, recalled next, and thus in
particular translates into the monotone µ-calculus by restricting the translation
of game logic.
As indicated in the introduction, CPDL satisfiability checking has been
shown to be ExpTime-complete [20], seemingly contradicting our results (Corol-
lary 34). Note however that the interpretation of atomic programs in CPDL, orig-
inally defined in terms of neighbourhood systems [20, p. 453], is, for purposes of
the ExpTime-hardness proof, explicitly changed to relations [20, pp. 458–459];
ExpTime-hardness then immediately follows since PDL becomes a sublogic of
CPDL [20, pp. 461]. Indeed, our results imply that under its original semantics,
CPDL presumably does not contain PDL (unless NP=ExpTime).
3. Game logic [16,19] extends CPDL by a further operator on programs,
dualization (−)d, and reinterprets programs as games between two players Angel
and Demon; in this view, dualization just corresponds to swapping the roles
of the players. In comparison to CPDL, the main effect of dualization is that
one obtains an additional demonic iteration operator (−)×, distinguished from
standard iteration (−)∗ by letting Demon choose whether or not to continue the
iteration. A game logic formula is alternation-free if it does not contain nested
occurrences (unless separated by a test) of (−)× within (−)∗ or vice versa [19].
Enqvist et al. [6] give a translation of game logic into the monotone µ-calculus
that is quite similar to Pratt’s [21] translation of PDL into the standard µ-
calculus. The translation (−)♯ is defined by commutation with all Boolean con-
nectives and by
(〈γ〉φ)♯ = τγ(φ
♯),
in mutual recursion with a function τγ that translates the effect of applying 〈γ〉
into the monotone µ-calculus. (Boxes [γ] can be replaced with 〈γd〉). We refrain
from repeating the full definition of τγ by recursion over γ; some key clauses are
τγ∩δ(ψ) = τγ(ψ) ∧ τδ(ψ) τγ∗(ψ) = µX. (ψ ∨ τγ(X)) τγ×(ψ) = νY. (ψ ∧ τγ(Y ))
where in the last two clauses, X and Y are chosen as fresh variables (for read-
ability, we gloss over a more precise treatment of this point given in [6]). The
first clause (and a similar one for ∪) appear at first sight to cause exponen-
tial blowup but recall that we measure the size of formulae in the monotone
µ-calculus by number of subformulae (cf. Remark 1); in this measure, there is in
fact no blowup. Under this translation, the alternation-free fragment ends up in
the aconjunctive alternation-free fragment of the monotone µ-calculus.
For later use, we note
Lemma 11. The monotone µ-calculus with the universal modality has the finite
model property.
Proof. We reduce to global assumptions as per Remark 9, and proceed by
straightforward adaptation of the translation of game logic into the relational
µ-calculus [19], thus inheriting the finite model property [2]. This translation
is based on turning neighbourhoods into additional states, connected to their
elements via a fresh relation e, and marking the original states with a fresh
propositional atom pe. Then, e.g., the monotone modality [a] (in our notation,
cf. Remark 3) is translated into [a]〈e〉(pe ∧ (−)) (relational modalities). More-
over, we translate a global assumption φ into a formula saying that all reachable
states satisfy pe → φ, expressed in the µ-calculus in a standard fashion. ⊓⊔
4 Timeouts
Throughout, we fix a closed, clean, irredundant target formula of the shape ψ =
ρ1∧ρ0, aiming to check ρ0-satisfiability of ρ1; we also require ψ to be alternation-
free and aconjunctive. We put n = |ψ| = |sub(ψ)|.
Definition 12 (Variable indexing).We define≥µ to be the least partial order
on the least fixpoint variables in ψ such thatX ≥µ Y whenever θ(Y ) ∈ sub(θ(X))
and X ∈ sub(θ(Y )). The index idx(X) of such a fixpoint variable X is
idx(X) = |{Y ∈ V | Y ≥µ X}|.
We use the index in inductions; for this purpose, note the following immediate
consequence of the definition.
Lemma 13. Let µX. φ ∈ sub(ψ). Then all free (necessarily least) fixpoint vari-
ables Y in φ have idx(Y ) < idx(X).
Definition 14 (Model timeouts). Let k be the greatest index of any least
fixpoint variable in ψ. Let W be a finite set. Then a timeout is a vector m =
(m1, . . . ,mk) of natural numbers such that mi ≤ |W | for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Given a
subformula φ ∈ sub(ψ) that contains a free least fixpoint variable (and hence no
free greatest fixpoint variable, since φ is alternation-free) and a timeout m, we
put
to(φ,m) = JφKσ(m),
where the valuation σ(m) is defined on X ∈ FV(φ) (necessarily a least fixpoint
variable) with θ(X) = µX. χ by induction on idx(X) as
(σ(m))(X) = (JχKXσ(m))
midx(X)(∅).
Notice here that the right hand side depends only on the free variables of χ
other than X , which by Lemma 13 all have strictly smaller index than X . For
1 ≤ i ≤ k, we also put m@i = (m1, . . . ,mi−1,mi − 1, |W |, . . . , |W |). Then we
have m >l m@i, where >l denotes lexicographic ordering.
Lemma 15. Let µX. φ ∈ sub(ψ). Then
1. JφKσ(m) depends only on the mi such that i ≤ idx(X);
2. for all A ⊆W , JφKXσ(m)(A) depends only on the mi such that i < idx(X).
Proof. The first claim is immediate from the inductive definition of σ(m), and
the second is immediate from the first. ⊓⊔
Remark 16. For simplicity, we opt to let all timeout vectors m have full
length k in spite of Lemma 15. Given µX. φ ∈ sub(ψ), the definition ofm@idx(X)
essentially initializes (to |W |) all timeouts for variables that might yet be en-
countered as bound variables further down in φ.
Lemma 17. Let W be finite. For all µX. φ ∈ sub(ψ) and all m =
(m1, . . . ,midx(X)−1, |W |, . . . , |W |), we have
JµX. φKσ(m) = JφKσ(m@idx(X)).
Proof. By Kleene’s fixpoint theorem, we have
JµX. φKσ(m) = (JφK
X
σ(m))
|W |(∅) = JφKXσ(m)((JφK
X
σ(m))
|W |−1(∅))
= JφKσ(m)[X 7→(JφKX
σ(m)
)|W |−1(∅)]
= JφKσ(m@idx(X)),
where in the last equality, we use that all free variables in φ have index at
most idx(X), so the two valuations agree on them: On free variables Y that
differ from X , and hence have index i < idx(X), σ(m)[X 7→ (JφKXσ(m))
|W |−1(∅)]
agrees with σ(m), which in turn agrees on Y with σ(m@idx(X)) by Lemma 15,
since m and m@idx(X) agree on all positions up to i. Concerning X itself, we
have mi = |W | for i = idx(X), so that the i-th value in m@idx(X) is |W | − 1.
Hence we have
(σ(m)[X 7→ (JφKXσ(m))
|W |−1(∅)])(X) = (JφKXσ(m))
|W |−1(∅)
= (JφKXσ(m@idx(X)))
|W |−1(∅)
= (σ(m@idx(X)))(X),
where the second equality is by Lemma 15.2. ⊓⊔
Lemma 18. For all finite neighbourhood models F , all valuations σ, and all
φ containing a free least fixpoint variable, there is some m such that JφKσ ⊆
to(φ,m) in F .
Proof. Induction on φ, using Lemma 17 in the step for fixpoint operators. ⊓⊔
The next lemma shows that, as expected, unfolding of least fixpoints reduces
timeouts.
Lemma 19. Let θ(X) = µX. φ. Then we have to(X,m) = to(φ,m@idx(X)).
Proof. We have
to(X,m) = JXKσ(m) = (σ(m))(X) = (JφK
X
σ(m))
midx(X)(∅)
= JφKXσ(m)((JφK
X
σ(m))
midx(X)−1(∅))
= JφK
σ(m)[X 7→((JφKX
σ(m)
)
m
idx(X)−1(∅))]
= JφKσ(m@idx(X)) = to(φ,m@idx(X)),
where in the next-to-last step we use Lemma 15.1. Indeed, m and m@idx(X)
agree at indices i < idx(X). For i = idx(X), recall that m@idx(X) =
(m1, . . . ,midx(X)−1,midx(X) − 1, |W |, . . . , |W |) so that
(σ(m)[X 7→ ((JφKXσ(m))
midx(X)−1(∅))])(X) = (JφKXσ(m))
midx(X)−1(∅)
= (JφKXσ(m@idx(X)))
midx(X)−1(∅)
= (σ(m@idx(X)))(X),
where the second equality is by Lemma 15.2. ⊓⊔
5 Deterministic Tracking Automata
A basic problem in the construction of models in fixpoint logics is to avoid infi-
nite unfolding of least fixpoints, also known as infinite deferral. For unrestricted
µ-calculi, infinite unfolding of least fixpoints is typically detected by means of
parity automata. However, since we restrict to alternation-free formulas, we can
instead use a Bu¨chi automaton to detect (and then reject) such infinite unfold-
ings by focussing on a subformula in the spirit of focus games [13]; crucially,
aconjunctivity of formulas allows us to use a deterministic automaton.
Definition 20 (Tracking automaton). We put Q = sub(ψ) ∪ {∗} and
F = {q ∈ Q | ∀X ∈ FV(q). X is a greatest fixpoint variable},
ensuring ∗ ∈ F by putting FV(∗) = ∅. Furthermore, we define
Σp = {(φ0 ∧ φ1, 0), (φ0 ∨ φ1, 0), (φ0 ∨ φ1, 1), (X, 0), (ηX.φ0, 0) |
φ0, φ1 ∈ sub(ψ), η ∈ {µ, ν}, X ∈ V}
Σm = {(〈a〉φ0, [a]φ1) | φ0, φ1 ∈ sub(ψ), a ∈ A}
The tracking automaton for ψ is the deterministic Bu¨chi automaton (Q,Σp ∪
Σm, δ, q0, F ) where q0 = ψ and δ : Q × Σ → Q is defined, on foc ∈ Q and
(χ, b) ∈ Σp, as δ(foc, (χ, b)) = ∗ if foc ∈ F (including the case that foc = ∗),
δ(foc, (χ, b)) = foc if foc /∈ F and χ 6= foc, and
δ(foc, (χ, b)) =


φi foc = φ0 ∧ φ1, i ∈ {0, 1}, φi /∈ F
φb foc = φ0 ∨ φ1
θ(X) foc = X
φ0 foc = µX. φ0
if foc /∈ F and χ = foc. By aconjunctivity, the clause for the case where foc =
φ0 ∧ φ1 is well-defined; by alternation-freeness, the case foc = νX. φ0 does not
occur for foc /∈ F . For (〈a〉φ0, [a]φ1) ∈ Σm, we put
δ(foc, (〈a〉φ0, [a]φ1)) =


φ0 foc = 〈a〉φ0, φ0 /∈ F
φ1 foc = [a]φ1, φ1 /∈ F
∗ otherwise.
We extend δ to words in the obvious way; e.g. δ(foc, w) = [a]X for
foc = µX. (p∨ (〈b〉p∧ [a]X)) w = (foc, 0), (p∨ (〈b〉p∧ [a]X), 1), (〈b〉p∧ [a]X, 0).
We observe |Q| = n+ 1.
6 Satisfiability Games
We proceed to establish a characterization of satisfiability via a game that com-
bines the tracking automaton (Q,Σp ∪ Σm, δ, q0, F ) for ψ with a propositional
transformation of formula sets guided by letters from Σp, embodied in the func-
tion γ defined next.
Definition 21. We define γ : P(sub(ψ)) ×Σp → P(sub(ψ)) by
γ(Γ, (χ, b)) ={φ0, φ1 | χ = φ0 ∧ φ1 ∈ Γ} ∪ {φi | χ = φ0 ∨ φ1 ∈ Γ, b = i}∪
{θ(X) | χ = X ∈ Γ} ∪ {φ0 | χ = ηX.φ0 ∈ Γ}
for Γ ⊆ sub(ψ), (χ, b) ∈ Σp. We extend γ to words over Σp in the obvious way.
Example 22. The letter (χ ∨ νX. (ψ1 ∧ ψ2), 1) picks the right disjunct and
(νX. (ψ1 ∧ ψ2), 0) passes through the fixpoint operator νX to reach ψ1 ∧ ψ2;
the letter (ψ1 ∧ ψ2, 1) picks both conjuncts. For φ = χ ∨ νX. (ψ1 ∧ ψ2) and
w = (χ ∨ νX. (ψ1 ∧ ψ2), 1), (νX.(ψ1 ∧ ψ2), 0), (ψ1 ∧ ψ2, 1), we hence have
γ({φ}, w) = {ψ1, ψ2}.
Recall that ψ = ρ1 ∧ ρ0, and we aim to check ρ0-satisfiability of ρ1, using the
following satisfiability game.
Definition 23 (Satisfiability games). Let sub0(ψ) ⊆ sub(ψ) consist of all
subformulae not containing top-level occurrences of ∧ or ∨, and let states(ψ)
denote the set of (formal) states, i.e. subsets Γ ⊆ sub0(ψ) such that {p, p} 6⊆ Γ
for all propositional atoms p. We define the ρ0-satisfiability game for ρ1 to be
the Bu¨chi game Gψ = (V,E, v0, F ◦ π2) with set V = V∃ ∪ V∀ of nodes (with the
union made disjoint by markers omitted in the notation) where V∃ = U ×Q for
U = {Ψ ⊆ sub(ψ) | 1 ≤ |Ψ | ≤ 2} (note |U | < n2) and V∀ = states(ψ) × Q, and
with initial node v0 = ({ρ1}, ∗) ∈ V∃; so a node (Ψ, foc) is accepting if and only
if foc ∈ F . The set E of moves is defined, for (Ψ, foc) ∈ V∃, (Γ, foc) ∈ V∀, by
E(Ψ, foc) = {(γ(Ψ ∪ {ρ0}, w), δ(foc, w)) ∈ states(ψ)×Q | w ∈ (Σp)
∗}
and
E(Γ, foc) = { ({φ0, φ1}, χ) ∈ U ×Q | {〈a〉φ0, [a]φ1} ⊆ Γ,
if foc 6= ∗, then χ = δ(foc, (〈a〉φ0, [a]φ1)),
if foc = ∗, then χ ∈ {φ0, φ1} }.
Thus, Eloise steers the propositional evolution of formula sets into formal states
while keeping track of the focused formula, while Abelard picks an application of
Lemma 2, and resets the focus after it is finished, i.e. becomes ∗.
Remark 24. It is crucial that while the game has exponentially many Abelard-
nodes, there are only polynomially many Eloise-nodes. In fact, all relevant Eloise-
nodes (Ψ, foc) have foc ∈ {∗}∪Ψ , so we can even restrict the game to have only
3|U | < 3n2 Eloise-nodes; we will use this tighter bound in the estimate on model
size (Corollary 32).
We first prove soundness:
Theorem 25. If ρ1 is ρ0-satisfiable, then player Eloise wins Gψ.
Proof. Let v ∈ W be a state in a neigbhourhood model F = (W,N, I) such
that Jρ0K = W and v ∈ Jρ1K. By Lemma 11, we can assume that W is finite.
We need to define a winning strategy s : (U × Q) ⇀ (states(ψ) × Q) for Eloise
in Gψ . We define s (and for later use, also a partial function c : U × Q ⇀ W ,
memorizing choices of states) for each Eloise-node (Ψ, foc) that is realized in F ,
i.e. JΨ ∪ {ρ0}K 6= ∅ in F and either foc = ∗ or foc ∈ Ψ . In particular, the initial
node ({ρ1}, ∗) is realized, since v ∈ Jρ1K∩ Jρ0K. So let (Ψ, foc) be a realized node.
If foc = ∗, then we pick some u ∈ JΨ ∪ {ρ0}K and put c(Ψ, foc) = u. If foc 6= ∗,
then foc ∈ Ψ and hence there is u′ ∈ JΨ ∪{ρ0}K so that, in particular, u′ ∈ JfocK.
By Lemma 18, there is a minimal timeoutm such that to(foc,m)∩JΨ∪{ρ0}K 6= ∅.
Pick u ∈ to(foc,m) ∩ JΨ ∪ {ρ0}K and put c(Ψ, foc) = u.
Next we inductively construct a word w ∈ (Σp)
∗, starting at (Γ0, foc0) = (Ψ∪
{ρ0}, foc). During the construction, we ensure the following invariants: For i ≥ 0,
we have c(Ψ, foc) ∈ JΓiK and there is mi ≤ m such that c(Ψ, foc) ∈ to(foci,mi) if
foci 6= ∗. For (Γi, foci), we pick some non-modal formula φ ∈ Γi. If φ = φ0 ∨ φ1,
then we pick li = (φ0 ∨ φ1, j) as the next letter where j ∈ {0, 1} is chosen such
that u ∈ JφjK, and additionally u ∈ to(φj ,mi) if φ = foci; there is at least
one such j. If φ = φ0 ∧ φ1, then pick li = (φ0 ∧ φ1, 0). If φ = X , then pick
li = (X, 0). If φ = ηX. φ0, then pick li = (ηX. φ0, 0). Put Γi+1 = γ(Γi, li) and
foci+1 = δ(foci, li) and continue with (Γi+1, foci+1), having c(Ψ, foc) ∈ JΓi+1K,
and if foci 6= ∗, then c(Ψ, foc) ∈ to(foci,mi+1) for some mi+1 ≤l mi ≤l m,
ensuring the invariant. By guardedness of fixpoint variables, this process unfolds
each least fixpoint formula at most once and hence will eventually terminate
with a pair (Γj ∈ states(ψ), focj) where Γj = γ(Ψ∪{ρ0}, (l0, l1, . . . , lj−1)), focj =
δ(foc, (l0, l1, . . . , lj−1)) and c(Ψ, foc) ∈ JΓjK. We put s(Ψ, foc) = (Γj , focj).
If focj 6= ∗, then foc 6= ∗ and, crucially, we have chosen disjuncts in such a
way that c(Ψ, foc) ∈ to(foc,m) and c(Ψ, foc) ∈ to(focj ,mj), where mj ≤l (m).
If there is some i such that foci is a least fixpoint variable and li = foci, then
we have that while |foci+1| > |foci|, the timeout mi decreases by Lemma 19
so that we have (mi+1, |foci+1|) <l (mi, |foci|) ≤l (m, |foc|), where ≤l is the
lexicographic order.
We need to show that s is a winning strategy. Let ρ = (Ψ0, foc0), (Γ0, foc
′
0),
(Ψ1, foc1), (Γ1, foc
′
1), . . . be an s-play that starts at ({ψ}, ∗) = (Ψ0, foc0). First we
show by induction that every Eloise-node (Ψi, foci) in ρ is realized (in particular, s
is defined where needed): We have already seen that (Ψ0, foc0) = ({ψ}, ∗) is
realized. If (Ψi, foci) is realized by c(Ψi, foci), then s(Ψi, foci) = (Γi, foc
′
i) is, by
construction of s, realized by c(Ψi, foci) as well. Since ((Γi, foc
′
i), (Ψi+1, foci+1))
is an Abelard-move in Gψ , there is a ∈ A such that {〈a〉ψ0, [a]ψ1} ⊆ Γi and
Ψi+1 = {ψ0, ψ1}. Since c(Ψi, foci) realizes (Γi, foc
′
i), we can pick ui+1 ∈ JΨi+1K
by Lemma 2. Since Jρ0K =W , we also have ui+1 ∈ Jρ0K. By definition of Gψ, we
also have foci+1 ∈ Ψi+1 or foci+1 = ∗ so that (Ψi+1, foci+1) indeed is realized.
It remains to establish the winning condition Inf(ρ ◦ π2) ∩ F 6= ∅. So let
i ≥ 0 such that foci contains a least fixpoint variable (so that foci /∈ F ). It
suffices to find a position j > i such that focj = ∗. Since (Ψi, foci) is realized,
we have c(Ψi, foci) and mi such that c(Ψi, foci) ∈ to(foci,mi). We proceed by
induction over (mi, |foci|), having, by construction of s, that if foc
′
i 6= ∗, then
c(Ψi, foci) ∈ to(foc
′
i,m
′
i) where (mi, |foci|) ≥l (m
′
i, |foc
′
i|). If foci+1 = ∗, then
we are done. Otherwise, we have c(Ψi+1, foci+1) ∈ to(foci+1,mi+1) and |foc
′
i| >
|foci+1| since the modal step from foc
′
i to foci+1 decreases the size of the formula.
Since c(Ψi+1, foci+1) has been chosen to have minimal timeout for foci+1, we have
mi+1 ≤l m
′
i. Hence (m
′
i, |foc
′
i|) >l (mi+1, |foci+1|). This shows that we eventually
reach a position j > i such that focj = ∗. ⊓⊔
Towards showing completeness of satisfiability games, we introduce the carrier
set of the prospective models.
Definition 26. We put
Y = {(Ψ,Foc, foc) ∈ U × (U ∪ {∅})×Q | Foc ⊆ Ψ, foc ∈ Foc or foc = ∗}.
The intuition behind this definition is the following: To obtain a model, up to
two least fixpoint formulae need to be tracked over modal steps, while at most
one of these formulae is focused in the game. To ensure satisfaction of all least
fixpoint formulae, we hence keep track of a two-element set of focused formulae
(Foc) and possibly mark one of them to be focused in the game (foc). We observe
that for (Ψ,Foc, foc) ∈ Y , Ψ has at most two elements and hence at most four
subsets, each containing at most two elements; there are three possible values
for foc (foc can be either one of the at most two formulae in Foc, or it can be
∗). Hence we have |Y | ≤ |U | · 4 · 3 < 12n2.
We go on to define a notion of neighbourhood models in which least fixpoint
formulae are timed-out, that is, are unfolded only finitely often.
Definition 27 (Timed-out model). A timed-out ρ0-model for ρ1 is a neigh-
bourhood model (Z,N, I) such that Z ⊆ Y and ({ρ1}, ∅, ∗) ∈ Z, equipped with
a labelling function l : Z → states(ψ) such that that l(x) ⊢PL Ψ ∪ {ρ0} for each
x = (Ψ,Foc, foc) ∈ Z, with ⊢PL denoting propositional entailment (where modal
literals [a]φ, 〈a〉φ are regarded as propositional atoms and φ, ηX. φ, and X entail
each other) and a labelling function e : (Z × Z)→ (Σm ∪ {∗}) such that
1. every infinite path through (Z,N, I) contains infinitely many states of the
shape (Ψ, ∅, ∗),
2. for all x = (Ψ,Foc, foc) ∈ Z such that l(x) contains no diamond formula,
then we have N(a, x) = ∅ for all a ∈ A; if l(x) contains some diamond formula
but no box formula, then we have N(a, x) = {∅} for all a ∈ A, and
3. for all x = (Ψ,Foc, foc) ∈ Z such that x contains both box and diamond
formulas and for all a ∈ A, we have
N(a, x) = {{n1,1, . . . , n1,m}, . . . , {no,1, . . . , no,m}},
where the a-modal literals in l(x) are exactly 〈a〉χ1, . . . , 〈a〉χo, [a]ψ1, . . . , [a]ψm,
where e(x, ni,j) = (〈a〉χi, [a]ψj) =: li,j and where ni,j = ({χi, ψi},Foci,j , foci,j).
The components Foci,j and foci,j are defined by case distinction on Foc:
– If Foc = ∅, then foc = ∗. We put Foci,j = {χi, ψi} and foci,j = χi.
– If Foc 6= ∅, then we distinguish cases depending on foc:
– If foc 6= ∗, then we put Foci,j = {δ(φ, li,j) | φ ∈ Foc} \ {∗} and foci,j =
δ(foc, li,j).
– If foc = ∗, then we have Foc = {φ} for some φ and put Foci,j =
{δ(φ, li,j)} \ {∗} and foci,j = δ(φ, li,j).
Theorem 28. If Eloise wins Gψ, then there is a timed-out ρ0-model for ρ1.
Proof. Let s be a history-free strategy winning strategy for Eloise. We con-
struct a neighbourhood model (Z,N, I) over Z = {(Ψ,Foc, foc) ∈ Y |
s wins (Ψ, foc) in Gψ}, so ({ρ1}, ∅, ∗) ∈ Z. To obtain a timed-out ρ0-model for
ρ1, we moreover define labelling functions l : Z → states(ψ) and e : (Z × Z) ⇀
(Σm ∪ {∗}). Let x = (Ψ,Foc, foc) ∈ Z. Then s(Ψ, foc) = (Γ, foc
′) and there is
a word w ∈ (Σp)∗ such that foc
′ = δ(foc, w) and Γ = γ(Ψ ∪ {ρ0}, w), imply-
ing Γ ⊢PL Ψ ∪ {ρ0}. We put l(x) = Γ , I(x) = Γ ∩ P and Foc
′ = {δ(φ,w) |
φ ∈ Foc} \ {∗} (so either foc′ ∈ Foc′ or foc′ = ∗). If Γ contains no diamond
formula, then we put N(a, x) = ∅ for all a ∈ A. If Γ contains some diamond
formula but no box formula, then we put N(a, x) = {∅} for all a ∈ A. If Γ
contains both diamond and box formulas, then we put, for a ∈ A,
N(a, x) = {{n(χ1, ψ1), . . . , n(χ1, ψm)}, . . . , {n(χo, ψ1), . . . , n(χo, ψm)}},
and e(x, n(χi, ψj)) = (〈a〉χi, [a]ψj) =: li,j , where the a-modal literals in Γ
are precisely 〈a〉χ1, . . . , 〈a〉χo, [a]ψ1, . . . , [a]ψm. We define n(χi, ψj) depending
on Foc′ and foc′. First, we put Foci,j = {δ(φ, li,j) | φ ∈ Foc
′} \ {∗} and
foci,j = δ(foc
′, li,j). Then we distinguish the following cases.
1. If Foc′ = ∅, then foc′ = ∗ and all formulae from Foc′ have been finished
(that is, transformed to a closed formula). Eloise wins both nodes ({χi, ψj}, χi)
and ({χi, ψj}, ψj) to which Abelard can move from (Γ, foc
′). We refocus, that is,
we put
n(χi, ψj) = ({χi, ψj}, {χi, ψj}, χi) ∈ Z.
2. If Foc′ 6= ∅, then we distinguish the following cases:
a) If foc′ 6= ∗, then the current focus in the game has not yet been finished
and the focus set is nonempty. Since Abelard can move to ({χi, ψj}, foci,j) from
(Γ, foc′) and s is a winning strategy, Eloise wins ({χi, ψj}, foci,j). We thus put
n(χi, ψj) = ({χi, ψj},Foci,j , foci,j) ∈ Z,
that is, we continue to track foci,j .
b) If foc′ = ∗, then necessarily |Foc′| = 1, i.e. the focus in the game has been
finished, but a further formula φ ∈ Foc′ remains to be finished in the model
construction. Since s is a winning strategy, Eloise wins both nodes ({χi, ψj}, χi)
and ({χi, ψj}, ψj) to which Abelard can move from (Γ, foc
′). We put
n(χi, ψj) = ({χi, ψj},Foci,j , δ(φ, li,j)) ∈ Z,
that is, we continue by tracking φ over the modal step, noting that δ(φ, li,j) is
either χi or ψj .
This concludes the construction of (Z,N, I) and the labelling functions
l, e. To see that these data constitute a timed-out ρ0-model for ρ1, it
remains only to establish Condition 1. of Definition 27. So let π =
(Ψ0,Foc0, foc0), (Ψ1,Foc1, foc1), . . . be an infinite path through (Z,N, I); that
is, for all i, we have a ∈ A and S ∈ N(a, (Ψi,Foci, foci)) such that
(Ψi+1,Foci+1, foci+1) ∈ S. By construction of N , this implies that there is an
s-play ρ = (Ψ0, foc0), s(Ψ0, foc0), (Ψ1, foc1), s(Ψ1, foc1), . . . . Since s is a winning
strategy, ρ contains infinitely many pairs (Ψj , focj) such that focj = ∗. So let i be
a position such that Foci 6= ∅ and let j be the first position greater than i such
that focj = ∗. If Focj = ∅, then we are done. Otherwise, (Ψj+1,Focj+1, focj+1)
is defined according to case 2.b) above. By definition of N , we have either
Focj+1 = ∅, in which case we are done, or Focj+1 = {focj+1}. Again, let j
′
be the first position greater than j such that focj′ = ∗. We have Focj′ = ∅ and
are done. ⊓⊔
It remains to show that timed-out models induce actual models:
Definition 29 (Pseudo-extension). Given a set Z ⊆ Y and a labelling func-
tion l : Z → states(ψ), we put (using propositional entailment ⊢PL as in Defini-
tion 27)
[̂[φ]] = {x ∈ Z | l(x) ⊢PL φ}.
Lemma 30 (Truth). In timed-out ρ0-models for ρ1, we have that for all closed
formulae φ ∈ sub(ψ), [̂[φ]] ⊆ JφK.
Proof (Sketch). Induction over φ, using coinduction to show satisfaction of great-
est fixpoint formulae and a further induction on timeouts for reaching empty
focus sets to show satisfaction of least fixpoint formulae. The detailed proof can
be found in the appendix. ⊓⊔
Theorem 31 (Completeness). If Eloise wins Gψ, then ρ1 is ρ0-satisfiable.
Proof. Suppose that Eloise wins Gψ. By Theorem 28, there is a timed-out neigh-
bourhood ρ0-model (Z,N, I) for ρ1. We claim that (Z,N, I) is a ρ0-model for ρ1.
By the truth lemma, it suffices to show [̂[ρ0]] = Z and [̂[ρ1]] ∩ Z 6= ∅. The former
holds by construction of (Z,N, I), and the latter holds because s wins ({ρ1}, ∗),
so that indeed ({ρ1}, ∅, ∗) ∈ [̂[ρ1]]. ⊓⊔
Corollary 32. Every satisfiable formula of size n in the alternation-free acon-
junctive monotone µ-calculus with the universal modality has a model of size at
most 12n2.
Corollary 33. The satisfiability checking problem for the alternation-free acon-
junctive monotone µ-calculus with the universal modality is in NP (hence NP-
complete).
Proof. Guess a winning strategy s for Eloise in Gψ and verify that s is a winning
strategy. Verification can be done in polynomial time since the structure obtained
from Gψ by imposing s is of polynomial size. ⊓⊔
By the translations recalled in Example 10, we obtain moreover
Corollary 34. Satisfiability-checking in concurrent propositional dynamic logic
CPDL and in the alternation-free fragment of game logic is in NP (hence NP-
complete).
7 Conclusion
We have shown that satisfiability checking in the aconjunctive alternation-free
fragment of the monotone µ-calculus with the universal modality is only NP-
complete, even when formula size is measured in terms of number of distinct sub-
formulae. Via straightforward translations (which have only linear blow-up under
the mentioned measure of formula size), it follows that both concurrent proposi-
tional dynamic logic (CPDL) and the alternation-free fragment of game logic are
also only NP-complete under their original semantics, i.e. with atomic programs
interpreted as neighbourhood structures (they become ExpTime-complete when
atomic programs are interpreted as relations). We leave as an open problem
whether the upper bound NP extends to the full monotone µ-calculus (or the
full alternation-free fragment), for which the best known upper bound thus re-
mains ExpTime, by results on the coalgebraic µ-calculus [4], or alternatively
by the translation into the relational µ-calculus that we give in the proof of the
finite model property (Lemma 11).
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A Omitted lemmas and proofs
We first introduce a notion of focus timeouts that we will use in the proof of the
truth lemma below where we show that least fixpoint formulae are satisfied in
timed-out models.
Definition 35 (Focus timeouts). Let (Z,N, I) be a timed-out ρ0-model for
ρ1 and let m ∈ N. Then we use fto(m) (for focus timeout) to denote the set of
states x ∈ Z such that, along each infinite path through (Z,N, I) that starts at
x, a state with empty focus set is reached after at most transitions. We refer to
a single transition (x, y) in such paths as modal steps (recall that there is some
a ∈ A and some S ∈ N(a, x) such that y ∈ S).
Lemma 36. Let (Z,N, I) be a timed-out ρ0-model for ρ1. Then there is, for all
x ∈ Z, some m ∈ N such that x ∈ fto(m).
Proof. Immediate from the definition of timed-out models. ⊓⊔
Full proof of Lemma 30 : We proceed by induction over φ, where the Boolean
and the modal cases are straightforward. E.g. let x ∈ [̂[〈a〉φ]]. Then we have
〈a〉φ ∈ l(x). If l(x) contains no box formula, then we have N(a, x) = {∅} so
that we have x ∈ J〈a〉φK since we have ∅ ∈ N(a, x) and, trivially, for all y ∈ ∅,
y ∈ JφK. If l(x) contains some box formula, then there is, by definition of timed-
out models, some S ∈ N(a, x) such that for all y ∈ S, we have y ∈ [̂[φ]]. By
the inductive hypothesis, we have y ∈ JφK for all y ∈ S so that x ∈ J〈a〉φK, as
required. For the fixpoint cases, we proceed as follows:
– If φ = νX. χ, then we have to show
̂[[νX. χ]] ⊆ JνX. χK =
⋃
{Y ⊆ Z | Y ⊆ JχKX(Y )},
which follows if ̂[[νX. χ]] is a postfixpoint of JχKX , that is, if ̂[[νX. χ]] = [̂[χ]] ⊆
JχKX(̂[[νX. χ]]) = JχK
[X 7→ ̂[[νX. χ]]]
. We show more generally that for all φ ∈ sub(χ)
and all σ such that for all Y ∈ FV(φ), σ(Y ) = ̂[[θ(Y )]], we have [̂[φ]] ⊆ JφKσ .
We proceed by induction over φ. If φ is closed, then we are done by the outer
inductive hypothesis. The Boolean and modal cases are again straightforward.
If φ = X , then we have [̂[X ]] = ̂[[θ(X)]] and JXKσ = σ(X) = ̂[[θ(X)]] so that
[̂[X ]] ⊆ JXKσ, as required. The remaining case is that φ is a fixpoint literal; since φ
is not closed, φ is, by alternation-freeness, a greatest fixpoint φ = νY. φ1. We
have to show ̂[[νY. φ1]] = [̂[φ1]] ⊆ JνY. φ1Kσ; by coinduction, it suffices to show that
[̂[φ1]] ⊆ Jφ1KYσ ([̂[φ1]]). Since Jφ1K
Y
σ ([̂[φ1]]) = Jφ1K
Y
σ (
̂[[νY. φ1]]) = Jφ1K
Y
σ (
̂[[θ(Y )]]) =
Jφ1Kσ[Y 7→( ̂[[θ(Y )]])], this follows from the inner inductive hypothesis.
– If φ = µX. χ, then we have to show
̂[[µX. χ]] = [̂[χ]] ⊆ JµX. χK
Recall that fto(m) denotes the set of states x ∈ Z such that along each path
through (Z,N, I) that starts at x, a state of shape (Ψ, ∅, ∗) is reached after at
most m modal steps. By Lemma 36, it suffices to show that for all φ ∈ sub(χ),
all m ∈ N, we have
[̂[φ]] ∩ fto(m) ⊆ JφK.
So let x = (Ψ,Foc, foc) ∈ [̂[φ]] ∩ fto(m). We distinguish cases.
a) If Foc ⊢PL φ, then we proceed by lexicographic induction over
(m, u(φ), |φ|), where u(φ) denotes the number of distinct fixpoint variables X
for which there is a formula that can be obtained from φ by repeatedly replacing
fixpoint variables Y with θ(Y ) and in which X is unguarded. If φ is closed, then
we are done by the outer induction hypothesis. The Boolean cases are again
straightforward. E.g. if φ = ψ0 ∧ ψ1, then we have
[̂[φ]] ∩ fto(m) = [̂[ψ0]] ∩ [̂[ψ1]] ∩ fto(m)
and JφK = Jψ0K ∩ Jψ1K. We have [̂[ψ0]] ∩ [̂[ψ1]] ∩ fto(m) ⊆ [̂[ψi]] ∩ fto(m) ⊆ JψiK
for i ∈ {0, 1}, where the second inclusion holds by the inductive hypothesis
since (m, u(φ), |φ|) ≥l (m, u(ψi), |ψi|). If φ = 〈a〉ψ0, then we have 〈a〉ψ0 ∈ l(x).
If l(x) contains no box formula, then we have N(a, x) = {∅} and hence
x ∈ J〈a〉ψ0K, as required. If l(x) contains some box formula, then there is,
by definition of timed-out models, some S ∈ N(a, x) such that for all y ∈ S,
y ∈ [̂[ψ0]]. Also, y ∈ fto(n − 1) since we have taken a modal step to get
from x to y. We have (n, u(〈a〉ψ0), |〈a〉ψ0|) >l (n − 1, u(ψ0), |ψ0|), even though
we possibly have u(〈a〉ψ0) < u(ψ0). By the inductive hypothesis, we have
y ∈ Jψ0K for all y ∈ S so that x ∈ J〈a〉ψ0K. If φ = X with θ(X) = µX.ψ1,
then [̂[X ]] ∩ fto(m) = [̂[ψ1]] ∩ fto(m) and JXK = Jψ1K. The fixpoint variable
X is unguarded in the formula X but it is not possible to (repeatedly) re-
place fixpoint variables Y in ψ1 with θ(Y ) in such a way that X becomes
unguarded in the resulting formula. Thus we have u(X) = u(ψ1) + 1 and
(m, u(X), |X |) >l (m, u(ψ1), |ψ1|) so that we are done by the inner induc-
tive hypothesis. If φ = µY. φ1, then ̂[[µY. ψ1]] ∩ fto(m) = [̂[ψ1]] ∩ fto(m) and
JµY. ψ1K = Jψ1K. Since (m, u|µY. ψ1|, |µY. ψ1|) >l (m, u|ψ1|, |ψ|), we are done
by the inner inductive hypothesis. Eventually, we reach a closed formula or the
case where m = 0, that is, a state with empty focus set. Since φ is entailed by
the focus set and since formulae are removed from the focus set only when the
tracking automaton transforms them to a closed formula, φ is closed in the case
that m = 0.
b) If Foc 6⊢PL φ, then we again proceed by induction over (m, u(φ), |φ|). The
inductive proof is identical to the previous item, with the exception of the base
case with m = 0. Then we have reached a state with empty focus set and have
Foc
′ ⊢PL φ′ after next modal step which is a refocusing step. Then we proceed
as in the previous item.
⊓⊔
